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but that concept does not take us very far. For the
Federal Reserve, some might put the issue this
way: At the time of each policy decision, the Fed
needs to explain what it did and why. If “the what”
refers to the target federal funds rate, then clear
disclosure of the policy action has been in place
since 1994. If “the what” refers to statements or
hints about future policy actions, then it seems
that the Fed does not have a settled policy on such
disclosure. Moreover, disclosing or explaining
“the why” of policy actions is obviously complex.
I’ll confine my analysis to the economics of
Fed communication policy. Disclosure issues in
the context of political accountability overlap
with the economics issues, but are not exactly
the same. The economics issue is this: How can
Fed communications make monetary policy more
effective? That question requires a view about
how the economy works.
My starting point is the concept of a full
rational expectations macroeconomic equilibrium.
The basic idea is that the private sector makes
decisions in the context of its expectations about
how the government will set policies of all kinds—
fiscal policies determining taxes and spending,
regulatory policies and monetary policies. I’ll
confine my discussion to monetary policies.
The baseline assumption is that the private
economy and the central bank have the same
information. I’ve discussed elsewhere what might
happen when information is asymmetric, but
will not take up that topic today.
C
entral bank communication is a topic
of increasing interest. There is a bur-
geoning literature in both the United
States and Europe, but I’ll confine
my comments to the U.S. context.1
Perhaps ironically, one reason for the height-
ened interest in Federal Reserve communication
policy is the Fed’s success in making its policy
decisions on the target federal funds rate highly
predictable. As has been documented in a number
of papers, the federal funds futures market quote
the day before an FOMC meeting has, with only
a few exceptions over the past decade, predicted
accurately the Committee’s decision on the target
federal funds rate. What captures the market’s
attention now is the Committee’s statement and
not its action on the target funds rate.
Because I’ve developed some pretty definite
views on the subject of Federal Reserve commu-
nication policy, it is especially important that I
issue the usual disclaimer before proceeding fur-
ther. The views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but retain full responsibility for errors.
A FRAMEWORK
The word “transparency” is often used in the
context of an agency’s or firm’s communications,
1 See especially Geneva Reports on the World Economy 3, “How Do Central Banks Talk?” I’ve developed my own thinking in a series of
speeches and papers; see Poole and Rasche (2000) and Poole (2003).A critical feature of the rational expectations
framework is that the central bank needs to be
clear about its objectives. Moreover, the funda-
mental objectives of monetary policy should be
stable over time, to provide a consistent basis for
efficient planning in the private sector. For exam-
ple, an inflation objective randomly chosen to be
5 percent one year and 1 percent another year
will not yield a good equilibrium because the
private sector will make mistakes in planning its
activities, and will expend resources unnecessar-
ily in trying to insure itself against the uncertain
inflation outcome. If and when circumstances
arise requiring fundamental policy objectives be
changed, it is imperative that the new objectives
be communicated to the market. Although there
has been an ongoing discussion in the Fed about
the advantages and disadvantages of a formal,
numerical inflation objective, I think the ambi-
guity with respect to the Fed’s inflation and
employment objectives is not large and is not the
main problem the Fed faces with its communica-
tion policies.
In the world of a rational expectations macro-
economic equilibrium, clarity with respect to both
goals and strategy in pursuing goals is a virtue.
This is an important point because the older
monetary policy literature, from a tradition that
predates the rational expectations revolution in
macroeconomics, argued at times that monetary
policy effectiveness depends on taking markets
by surprise and creating uncertainty. Some
observers still make this argument today. I reject
this view; I know of no convincing models where
policy-induced uncertainty yields superior eco-
nomic outcomes.
One requirement, then, for an efficient
rational expectations macroeconomic equilibrium
is that the central bank have clear policy goals.
Another requirement is that the private sector
and the central bank have a common, and correct,
understanding of the economy’s structure—of
how the economy works. The central bank must
have a view as to how the economy works to
know how to forecast the effects of policy actions,
which I’ll measure by adjustments in the target
federal funds rate. The private sector must have
the same view, for otherwise it will make forecasts
of the effects of policy actions that differ from
the central bank’s forecasts. A stable, efficient
equilibrium is unlikely to prevail when the pri-
vate sector and the central bank have substantially
different views as to how the economy works. The
strategy of monetary policy depends critically
on the central bank’s view as to how the econ-
omy works; thus, the central bank needs to con-
vey its views in this regard to the maximum
possible extent. Of course, reducing uncertainty
is not the only important feature of monetary
policy design—the systematic part of policy also
needs to be well designed to achieve policy
objectives in the most efficient possible way.
Given all the uncertainties and controversies
in macroeconomics, it may seem that any attempt
to construct a communication framework around
the assumption of a common understanding of
how the economy works must fail. In fact, the
situation is much more hopeful. I believe there is
a common understanding about many features of
macroeconomic behavior and that we can sweep
areas of uncertainty into an analytical uncertainty
basket. There is agreement about most macro-
economic relationships at a qualitative and direc-
tional level, at least in the context of monetary
policy conducted for stabilization purposes.
Appreciating the uncertainty that macroecono-
mists share is an essential element of crafting a
good communication strategy. That is, the central
bank and the private sector can have a common
understanding of the nature of the uncertainty
basket and understand the significance of that
fact for the conduct of monetary policy.
The third essential element of the framework
is that economic change and economic outcomes
that differ from forecasts are a consequence of
the arrival of new information that is inherently
unforecastable, at least at the current level of
economic science. As new information arrives—
often called “shocks” to emphasize the unfore-
castable or surprise nature that is inherent in new
information—the private sector and the central
bank have a common understanding of the impli-
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implications for adjustments in the monetary
policy instrument. There is an extensive literature
showing how interest rates respond to surprises
in the routine flow of economic data on employ-
ment, inflation, housing starts, industrial produc-
tion and so forth.
The response to new information in the fed-
eral funds futures market is a direct bet on how
the Federal Reserve will respond to the new infor-
mation in setting the target federal funds rate.
Given the accuracy of the fed funds futures market
in predicting Fed decisions on the target fed funds
rate, this literature supports the view that the
rational expectations framework is useful for
understanding actual market behavior as it relates
to monetary policy decisions.
APPROACHING NIRVANA
The abstraction of the full rational expecta-
tions macroeconomic equilibrium provides a
framework for a communication agenda. How
can Fed communications help move the economy
closer to the nirvana of the full and efficient
rational expectations equilibrium?
To provide a very specific focus for my
remarks, I’ll concentrate on the short statement
released at the conclusion of every FOMC meet-
ing. That statement is the first step of an exten-
sive process of explaining policy through minutes
of FOMC meetings, speeches and testimony.
An important feature of the policy statement
is an explanation of the reasons for the FOMC’s
decision on the target federal funds rate. The
most recent statement, issued the afternoon of
March 22, is a good example. The statement
emphasized the FOMC’s increased concern over
inflation, as evidence is accumulating that firms
perceive an increase in their pricing power. From
my perspective, the market reaction to that state-
ment made a lot of sense and reflected my own
assessment of a changing inflation environment.
The changed language in the statement not only
explained the 25-basis-points increase in the tar-
get federal funds rate but also the renewal of the
“measured pace” phrase that indicates that the
FOMC anticipates further increases in the target
rate at future meetings.
The situation prevailing for about a year now,
in which it has been reasonable to expect future
increases in the target federal funds rate, is highly
unusual. In my experience, most of the time it is
not especially clear what the future pace of policy
adjustments will be. This fact flows from the
observation I offered earlier, that change in the
economy and policy adjustments in response to
change flow from the arrival of new information.
Ordinarily, policy adjustments cannot be pre-
dicted with much accuracy because shocks that
create the need for policy adjustments are not
forecastable.
This point is extremely important. I some-
times hear pleas from market participants that
the Fed should make clear in advance what it is
going to do, to reduce uncertainty and make plan-
ning easier. A little thought should lead market
participants to stop thinking this way. Suppose
the Fed had advertised an expectation of an
unchanged target federal funds rate in early
September 2001. Should the Fed not have
responded to the 9/11 shock? Obviously, the Fed
should respond to such a shock; more generally,
the Fed needs always to be open to responding to
new information when it is of such a magnitude
to call for a policy response, or when smaller
individual pieces of information accumulate to
such a point.
Let me formalize this point. Consider both
the target fed funds rate coming out of an FOMC
meeting and the rate coming out of a meeting six
months later. How much of the change in the
target rate over the six-month interval is deter-
mined by information available at the first meet-
ing and how much by unforecastable information
arriving between the two meetings? I have not
attempted a formal statistical investigation of
this question, but am willing to assert that most
of the time the change in the target rate over a
six-month interval is driven by new information
over the six months and not much by information
in hand at the beginning of the interval.
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the FOMC cannot provide accurate information
to the market as to the probable course of the
target fed funds rate, in terms of a specific path
measured in basis points. The future path will
be conditional on future information that cannot
itself be predicted. Attempts to provide specific
forward-looking guidance will prove inaccurate
and even misleading to the market. Moreover, the
Fed could create a credibility problem for itself
if forward guidance is too specific. If the market
acts on the guidance, and the Fed subsequently
responds to new information in a way that departs
from the guidance, then the market will naturally
feel that it has been misled. But if the Fed fails to
respond to new information that seems to demand
a response, in the interest of doing what it said it
was going to do, then failure to respond may also
damage credibility.
In short, the Fed should only offer specific
guidance for the fed funds target path in circum-
stances in which it is highly probable that the
specified path will remain appropriate in the
face of new information. Generally, commitments
need to be carefully conditioned so that the mar-
ket understands that new information may require
a different policy course. The Fed needs to explain
as clearly as possible the conditionality of a
commitment, and how the nature of the commit-
ment must depend on circumstances. Most of
the time, the most likely fed funds target rate six
months in the future will be close to the rate at
the beginning of the period; the outcome will
depend on shocks over the interval.
It is also true that most of the time the policy
outlook is asymmetric. Asymmetry arises because
it is ordinarily the case that the economy’s per-
formance points to the need for the federal funds
target rate in coming months to either: a) stay the
same or increase; or b) stay the same or decrease.
It is rare for the situation to be such that the odds
of tightening in the near future are the same as
the odds of easing. The policy situation becomes
asymmetric when the economic situation becomes
asymmetric. As I speak right now, for example,
the upward thrust to the economy appears quite
substantial and the risk of higher inflation over
the next six months or so seems clearly greater
than the risk that inflation will fall below a desir-
able range. The aim of monetary policy should be
to counter inflation pressures with a less accom-
modative policy stance, so that higher actual
inflation does not extend beyond unavoidable
transitory effects. Put another way, monetary
policy should ensure that inflation pressures do
not get built into inflation expectations and a
higher actual inflation rate over a medium-term
horizon.
The Fed’s communication issue is this: Can
the policy statement provide an accurate view of
the extent to which the Committee believes the
policy outlook has become asymmetric without
triggering firm market expectations of an adjust-
ment of the federal funds target at the next meet-
ing? Asymmetry does not necessarily imply a
high probability of a rate change in a particular
direction at the next FOMC meeting, or the sev-
eral meetings after that. What asymmetry does
imply is that if new information mostly comes in
one way—positive surprises, for example—then
a policy adjustment will probably be appropriate.
The communication challenge is to provide
the market a correct sense of the probabilities
and of the sort of new information that might
justify policy action. I do not have a settled view
on this issue, but lean toward the position that
trying to convey an accurate sense of asymmetry
is more likely to be misleading to the market than
helpful. The problem is that the market may read
a statement of asymmetry as a hint of expected
policy action at the next FOMC meeting, when
no hint is intended. My own preference is to dis-
cuss the issue in general, and let the market sense
a developing asymmetry from observing the same
information flow the FOMC observes. Then, when
subsequent shocks create the case for future policy
action, the market will respond to those shocks
by changing its policy expectations, which will
be recorded in the federal funds futures market.
I’ve emphasized the importance of clarity of
policy goals. I’ve emphasized the importance of
reducing uncertainty with respect to Fed policy
wherever possible. I’ll finish with one other com-
ment. Policy statements need to be crafted care-
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that language will be misunderstood. This task is
much harder than it might seem, in part because
economists’ language contains words with iden-
tical spelling but different meanings than in ordi-
nary English. It is important that the Fed avoid
inadvertently misleading the market. For this
reason, I have been an advocate of crafting the
policy statement at the conclusion of each FOMC
meeting from stock phrases that have been given
clear meaning through discussion over time and
sustained and repeated use over time. Anyone
who has read FOMC meeting statements knows
that continuity is an important feature of them,
and that the market appropriately focuses on what
has and has not changed from one meeting to the
next.
Although statements in recent years reflect
considerable continuity, changes usually come as
a surprise to the market, and the initial meaning
of new phrases has not always been clear. For
that reason, I think the FOMC could improve
clarity, especially when policy direction changes,
by agreeing in advance on stock phrases to
describe different situations. The stock phrases
from which policy statements would be put
together could be explained in advance of actual
use. Some will regard resort to stock phrases as
boilerplate that is the very opposite of trans-
parency. My view is that a handful of standard
options to describe the Committee’s summary
evaluation of the state of the economy and the
stance of policy would promote clarity and there-
fore transparency. The purpose of transparency
is not served when the market greets a new state-
ment with multiple interpretations.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
Clear policy communication requires a policy
framework. The abstraction of a rational expec-
tations macroeconomic equilibrium provides
such a framework. An essential feature of such
an equilibrium is that the economy evolves in
responses to shocks—new information that can-
not be predicted in advance. Appropriate mone-
tary policy must also evolve in response to the
same shocks. I believe that this framework takes
us a long way in thinking with precision about
communication issues. We need to be as clear as
we can be about what we know, and emphasize
that monetary policy actions must be conditioned
on new information. That’s my message—I hope
I’ve communicated clearly!
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